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where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former
defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions.
Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, we add the possibility of in-
teraction with a new ”low cost” player who, it is known, does not make social
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Abstract:  We examine the link between social institutions and individuals' propensity to
cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework.  To begin, we transform the usual prisoner's
dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material
preferences.  By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise
imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on
expected partner behavior.  All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis.  As
such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts.  Exogenous social policy can affect
cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if
preferences are endogenous.  Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly
cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform).
This behavior suggests further roles for institutions.  Finally, continuing the effort to analyze
community, we add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost" player who, it is known,
does not make social investments.
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I.  Introduction
Since economists emphasize rationality and self-interest, it s asy to explain free-riding,
shirking, and just nasty behavior in general.  People certainly do act selfishly, but motivations are
more complex than that.  People also cooperate, behave altruistically, and violate the principle of
self-interest -- narrowly conceived as the sole pursuit of material well-being.  We tip, vote,
contribute to public causes, and honor agreements even in the absence of material sanctions.
Sometimes we are "good Samaritans," "do the right thing," or are trustworthy even when we
know that we will not be rewarded.   We also take revenge and fight in wars at great personal
cost.  These important behaviors emerge even in one-shot settings (e.g., tip in a restaurant we will
never visit again) and when the situation is certain.  As such, they do not fit neatly into the
conception of rational economic man.  The question is, where do these cooperative type behaviors
come from?
Our explanation hinges on the recognition that preferences (1) cover the non-material, and
(2) are at least partly endogenous, and, as such, can be influenced by institutions and culture.
While economists have held to the assumption of exogenous preferences in order to avoid
tautological explanations of behavior as arising from (any) taste, the assumption is no longer
tenable.  Preferences are both xogenous and endogenous.  Some preferences are given to us by
our families, caregivers, and later, social groups.  It is also unnecessarily restrictive to confine
preferences to mappings over only material goods.  People have preferences over truth-telling and
honesty, for instance, which may sometimes be at odds with material well-being.  Actions contrary
to these preferences result in internal costs, quite apart from any external sanctions.
By incorporating a "conscience" in at least some individuals, and to varying degrees, we
can begin to examine the effect of certain institutions on cooperation.  This is an important
endeavor because while there is a good deal of cooperation in society, its existence may largely
depend on non-material preferences.  If preferences are at least partly endogenous, then
institutions affect the degree of cooperation in society.
In this paper we examine the link between social institutions and individuals' propensity to
cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework.  To begin, we transform the usual prisoner's
dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material
preferences.  By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise
imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on
expected partner behavior.  All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis.  As
such our model represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts.  Exogenous social policy can
affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if
preferences are endogenous.  Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly
cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform).
We suggest how such switching creates further roles for institutions.  Finally, continuing the effort
to analyze  community, we add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost" player who, it
is known, does not make social investments.
II.  Preferences, Culture, and Institutions
In this section we examine the origins of non-material, endogenous preferences and their
relationship to economic institutions.
Many scholars recognize that preferences and motivations are subject to social forces.  To
the extent that behaviors are learned, they are transmitted by culture and society through  our
families and social groups.  When we are young, we learn (often by imitation) from our parents
and caregivers.  As adults we learn more from direct experience and our social groups.
Summarizing the process of cultural transmission, Boyd and Richerson (1990), p.114) write:
Humans acquire attitudes, beliefs, and other kinds of information from others by social 
learning, and these items of cultural information affect individual behavior.  Cultural 
transmission leads to patterns of heritable variation within and among human societies.  
While individual decisions are important in determining b havior, these decisions depend 
on individuals' beliefs, often learned from others, about what is important and valuable, 
and how the world works.  Human decision-makers are enmeshed in a web of tradition; 
individuals acquire ideas from their culture, and in turn make modifications of what they 
learn, which modifications become part of the cumulative change of the tradition.
These authors suggest that "human behavior represents a compromise between genetically
inherited selfish impulses and more cooperative, culturally acquired values."  The notion of
endogenous preferences has its roots at least as far back to the Classical economists like Smith
and Marx, and  has become a center piece of newer schools like Feminist economic thought [see
Nelson (1995) who argues that people do not spring up like fully formed mushrooms].  And the
list goes on.  In contrast, mainstream economists have not embraced endogenous preferences for
fear that behavioral scientists might attempt to trivially explain behavior by simply positing a taste
for it [see Stigler and Becker (1977)].  We acknowledge that hazard but adopt the position that
realism in behavior assumptions is preferred if they can be carefully identified and if they can
generate non-trivial and insightful implications.
Preferences also cannot be confined to just material goods and/or pleasurable activities.
We possess notions of fairness and right and wrong.  Sen (1978) notes we may perform an
altruistic act out of internally motivated sympathy or out of a sense of duty bound commitment.
Etzioni (1988) suggests simply that we are moral creatures and that this fact often eludes
economists.  So, while entire literatures like the theory of the firm are built on the notion that
people are opportunistic shirkers, preferences and motivations are more complex than that.  The
existence of a conscience suggests that, at the very least, some people possess conflicting
preferences over doing what's right and what's pleasurable.  And to the extent that a conscience
reflects certain preferences, endogeniety suggests that they can sometimes be affected by society.
Among other things, culture embodies social institutions, where institutions constrain
human behavior.  Constraints tell us what we can and cannot do.  North (1990) differentiates
between informal and formal constraints.  Informal constraints include norms, customs, and codes
of behavior reflecting social values.  These social values, in turn, may affect individuals'
preferences and hence propensity to cooperate, trust, and act self-interestedly.  In contrast, formal
constraints emerge from purposeful human action.  Institutions like laws, schools, religion,
government and other organizations are formal constraints that both reinforce and reflect values
inherent in informal constraints.  For instance, most religions teach truth-telling as opposed to
lying.  If truth-telling becomes a social value, then an individual decision-maker must consider the
ill effects of violating that value in, say,  reneging on a contract.  The penalty can be an external
social sanction, which could be modeled in the constraint of an individual's utility maximization
problem.  Or, if the value is internalized by the individual, then truth-telling has become a
preference and lying would result in disutility.  This latter scenario reflects Sen's notion of
sympathy.  Note that if the individual internalized the value as a preference, the individual would
tend to tell the truth even in the absence of external social sanction (that is, even if the constraint
were relaxed).
Economists have long recognized the importance of institutions like religion and schooling
in the economy.  For example, Adam Smith (1976) in The Theory of Moral Sentiments noted that
religion and religious beliefs could instill values that people would follow irrespective of external
sanctions:
The idea that, however we may escape the observation of man or be placed above the
reach of human punishment, yet we are always acting under the eye, and exposed to the 
punishment of God, ... is a motive capable of restraining the most headstrong passions, 
with those at least, who by constant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them. (p. 281)
More recently, Reder (1979) argued that values (ethics and morality) are instilled in the
"formative years" of human development, and that society benefits from more moral behavior
because less resources have to be devoted to safeguarding promises.  Since society benefits from
more moral behavior, he concludes that the church and state have intentionally played a role in
instilling moral values.   Lipford, McCormick and Tollison (1993) found that religious
involvement is negatively correlated with crime and illegitimate births.  Again, we may interpret
these findings as formal constraints influencing informal constraints in the culture.  While religion
may have emerged to offer "meaning," or ease fears about the Unknown, it also instills certain
values that have economic significance.  Thus, it may serve a functional role for society apart from
the reason for its existence.
Schools also instill values, as noted, for example, by Lott (1990) and Bowles and Gintis
(1976).  Bowles and Gintis argue that public schooling instills values such as acquiescence to
authority and to hierarchy, both valued by employers.  Lott argues that public schooling reduces
the cost of government transfers because its recipients are more willing to view government as
properly serving that purpose.  But schools also attempt to teach children fairness and honesty.  In
school children learn a social identity and social rules of interaction.  Children learn that their
actions have consequences upon others and that hurting others can sometimes hurt one's self.
We have tried to establish the link between non-material, endogenous preferences and
social institutions.  We now need a model to capture these relationships in a non-trivial way.
First, we introduce non-material preferences into a one period prisoner's dilemma framework in
order to examine their affects on social interaction.  Three separate "types" endogenously emerge.
Next we examine the effects of institutions, like education and religion, on endogenous
preferences.  Then repeated play, or interaction, is considered.  Somewhat surprisingly, we find
"switching" behavior which suggests different roles for social institutions.  Finally, we add a new
player to see the affects on community.
 
III.   Model
We assume that agent i's utility, Ui, includes wealth, Wi, and the disutility associated with
the non-material preference over defecting or cheating, xi. T at s
Wi if cooperate
Ui = (1)
Wi - xi          if defect.
xi  is the internal cost of not "doing the right thing," which is contextual.  In one instance it may be
violating the principle of honesty, in another it may be violating a "code of honor," as in the
original prisoner's dilemma game.  As a concrete example, one may think of x as the guilt
associated with defecting in a prisoner's dilemma type interaction.  Suppose the context is one
where lying yields a higher material payoff, and x is the associated internal cost of dishonesty.  We
assume x differs across agents, reflecting, for example, different degrees of (endogenous)
indoctrination of social values and/or (exogenous) genetic predisposition to feelings of guilt. [For
the first part of the analysis it does not matter if x is determined exogenously or endogenously].
Thus this formulation includes the possibility that players are only concerned with material payoffs
if x=0, but is more general because it allows other, perhaps moral, motivations. Specifically, in
the model we will assume that xi is distributed uniformly across the population of agents (which is
normalized to be one) on the interval [0,x].
    A player's wealth emerges from a single play of a prisoner's dilemma game with another
randomly chosen member of the population. The payoff matrix of the game is given by
                                                          Player I
                                                        Cooperate      Defect
Player II        Cooperate         5, 5           0, 6
                      Defect                             6, 0           2, 2
             Matrix 1.
where the first entry in each cell is player II's payoff and the second is player I's. Of course, if
players are concerned only with wealth, the equilibrium of a one-shot play of the game is (Defect,
Defect). As the previous discussion suggests, however, cooperation can emerge if players
maximize utility rather than simply wealth, provided that disutility exists with defecting. This is
the role of x.
          Specifically, if xI and xII are the monetized disutilities of defecting for players I and II, then
matrix 1 becomes
                                                                     Player I
                                                     Cooperate            Defect
Player II         Cooperate                   5, 5                 0, 6-xI
                       Defect                         6-xII, 0         2-xII, 2-xI
             Matrix 2.
Although the players cannot observe the value of their opponent's x, Matrix 2 is no longer
necessarily a prisoner's dilemma and (Defect, Defect) is not necessarily the equilibrium. In what
follows, we derive the equilibrium given a random pairing of players, assuming that x is uniformly
distributed on [0,3] (i.e., x=3).
          In deriving this equilibrium, define p as the fraction of agents who cooperate and 1-p as the
fraction who defect. p therefore represents a rational player's best assessment of the probability
that a randomly chosen partner will cooperate.  Given p, consider a representative agent's decision
to cooperate or defect. Cooperating yields an expected utility of
UC = 5p + 0(1-p) = 5p,
and defecting yields an expected utility of
UD = 6p + (1-p)2 - x = 2 +4p - x.
The player cooperates if
x >  2 - p. (2)
          In equilibrium, the players' beliefs about p must be fulfilled. Thus,
p = Pr(x >2-p). (3)
Given that x is distributed uniformly on [0,3], (3) becomes
p = 1 - (2-p) / 3,
which implies that
p = 1/2.
If we substitute p=1/2 into (2) we find that players with x>1.5 cooperate, and players with x<1.5
defect.
          Special insight emerges by examining the behavior of agents at the extremes of p=0 and
p=1. When p=0, then UC=0 and UD=2-x. Thus, players with x>2 always cooperate, ev n if their
opponent is a known defector. Similarly, when p=1, UC=5 and UD=6-x. Thus, players with x<1
never cooperate, even with a known cooperator. For this reason, we refer to players with x>2 as
pure cooperators (C's) and players with x<1 as pure defectors (D's).  As for players with 1<x<2,
they prefer to cooperate if their opponent is a known cooperator, but prefer to defect if their
opponent is a known defector.  Specifically, if p=1, UC> D if 5>6-x, or x>1; and if p=0, UD>UC if
x<2.  We refer to these agents as "conditional players" (CP's). Note that in the equilibrium
described by (2) and (3), all D's and half of the CP's defect; and all C's and half of the CP's
cooperate (See Figure 1).
By introducing a continuum of types, the analysis shows that three different modes of
purposeful behavior emerge.  Those adopting the first mode, D's, are not concerned with others'
welfare and thus seek to maximize their own material payoffs.  This behavior, which is that
typically postulated by economists for all individuals, reflects that found in usual analyses of
prisoner dilemma games. In contrast, members of second group, C's, never defect and are never
distrustful.  Its members cooperate with both the trustworthy and the non-trustworthy, perhaps
because of religious beliefs.  Thus, in contrast with the purely selfish types, these types "turn the
other cheek."  The third group, CP's, are something of a mixture between the first two.  Its
members may be influenced by social values in that they cooperate with cooperators, but their
preferences are sufficiently material that they dislike being "suckers."  Thus, they defect with
known defectors rather than turning the other cheek.  This behavior is not the result of any
imposed strategy;  instead, it arises endogenously.  This third group is of special interest because
it can be influenced.
i.  The Role of Institutions
So far the endogeniety of preferences has not played a cruci l role in the analysis.  The
affect of social institutions on preferences can be illustrated by supposing that resources can be
devoted to increasing the average x in society in an effort to increase the amount of cooperation
(and hence, social wealth).  Given a uniform distribution, the average x can be increased, for
example, by increasing the upper bound x.  However, suppose that this involves a resource cost of
C(x), where C'>0  and C''>0.  The benefit of increasing x is that cooperation, and hence wealth,
increases.  In particular, it is easy to show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperation as a
function of x is given by
p = (x-2) / (x-1),
which is increasing in x.  Some CP's who previously would have defected now cooperate to avoid
the increased disutility associated with a higher x.  Further, recall that cooperator's wealth is 5p,
and the wealth of defectors is 2+4p.  Cooperators' total wealth is therefore 5p2 (i.e., th  "number"
of cooperators, p, times wealth per cooperator), while the total wealth of defectors is (2+4p)(1-
p).  Adding these expressions yields total wealth of p2+2p+2, which, given the above expression
for p, is also an increasing function of x.  The "optimal" x maximizes total wealth minus C(x).
[For example, if C(x)=.1x2, then the optimal x is 3.2].
It could be questioned whether x is really a choice variable in the sense that society can
consciously select it to maximize net wealth (or welfare).  x is a policy variable in the sense that
much of eduction is either publicly provided or subsidized, religion is subsidized through its tax
exempt status, and families are variously subsidized and taxed as a matter of government policy.
Since all of these institutions contribute to the indoctrination of individuals in a manner we have
discussed, the average x can be manipulated by adjusting these implicit subsidies.  While policy
makers may not possess the requisite information to optimally adjust x, our an lysis simply
suggests that an optimal x y exist and that policy makers can manipulate x, howev r
imperfectly, to influence cooperation rates, wealth, and welfare.
Discussion
Our model mirrors other recent efforts in some respects.  Frank (1987) formulates a model
with two groups, pure cooperators and pure defectors (our first two groups).  If a cost to
detection about partner type exists (a cost that can be reduced by signals of emotion), then an
evolutionary stable equilibrium can include both types.  Witt (1986) also uses the dynamic
framework of evolutionary stability, but includes social learning in a threat game to produce
cooperative behavior.  Other costs can induce cooperation.  Guttman (1996) shows that
cooperation can result if it is costly for rational players to calculate population characteristics
and/or optimal strategies.  Sethi (1996) shows that a penalty associated with defection could
induce cooperation among rational types.  The penalty could be a function of the chances of
playing with a genetic "bully," one who punishes defecting partners.  Rabin (1993) postulates a
notion of fairness in which players wish to cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors
in one-shot games.  This form of preferences induces what he calls "fairness equilibria."  Finally,
our analysis is most similar to Casson's (1991) effort in the important way that it also introduces a
non-material, internal cost to cheating.  Contextually, Casson focuses on a leader's ability to instill
the preference of trustworthiness in his followers.  Our discussion of the ability of institutions to
create cooperation is qualitatively similar.
So far our model differs from all the previous approaches because by introducing a
continuum of types we show that: (1) three separate behaviors arise endogenously, all of which
are included in our analysis, and (2) exogenous changes in social institutions can affect
cooperation rates. Our model also differs from Frank's because group behavior is both
exogenously (by social institutions) and endogenously (by continuous types) determined.  Our
results are consistent with the results of the experimental literature, but different from Frank, Witt,
Guttman, and Sethi because cooperative behavior emerges in a one shot-game.  Guttman and
Sethi find cooperation because of external costs of interaction, we find it because of the "internal"
costs associated with ones own preferences.  Our model is similar to Rabin's in that he also
includes an adjustment to material payoffs (a "kindness function") which potentially changes the
players' strategies (and hence, the equilibrium of the game).  However, his adjustment factor is
based on beliefs about what the other players are doing, whereas our adjustment is internal to
each player depending, for example, on the degree of his or her indoctrination.  As a result,
players in our model can be single-minded cooperators or defectors (as in Frank), or "conditional
players", whereas Rabin only considers the latter.
We next consider the effects of repeated interaction.  It turns out that some agents who
cooperated in the first period now defect, and some who previously defected now cooperate.
This "switching" behavior implies different roles for institutions.
ii.  Repeated Play
Consider now what happens if we add a second period to the model in which all agents
randomly pair with a new partner.  All agents remain uncertain about other agents' types, but
when a new pairing occurs, each agent can observe what strategy his partner adopted in the first
period.  This information allows them to update their estimates of their new partners' x, which in
turn allows them to update the probability that their partners will cooperate.  Therefore, in
modelling behavior, we employ Bayesian updating -- an adaptive strategy.  This strategy not only
keeps the analysis tractable, but also seems empirically realistic.  The question is whether this
updating induces a change in the behavior of any of the agents.  Once again the agents of interest
are the CP's (i.e. those whose x falls between 1 and 2) because, as noted, the C's (x>2) and D's
(x<1) will continue to pursue their preferred strategies regardless of the anticipated behavior of
their partner.
In terms of the model, the condition for a party to choose cooperation continues to be
given by (2); but now the calculation of p is different.  Specifically, this probability is now
conditional on the observed behavior of both agents in the previous period.  Thus, we define pij to
be the conditional probability one's partner will cooperate, conditional on the the fact that the
partner played strategy i in the first period, and the party forming the estimate played strategy j,
where i,j=C,D.  The actual calculation of pij will depend on which of the following pairings is
relevant: (1) both agents played C in the first period, (2) both agents played D, and (3) one agent
played C and one played D.  We consider each scenario in turn.
When both agents cooperated in period one, it follows that each has x>1.5 (see Figure 1).
This is important because it means that each agent's preferences are such that he would prefer to
cooperate if his partner cooperates.  Thus, by analogy to (3), we define pCC as follows:
pCC = Pr(x > 1 - pCC | x > 1.5). (4)
Given that x is uniform on [0,3], and the constraint that pCC 1, (4) becomes
pCC = max{1, [3-(2-pCC)]/1.5},
or
pCC = max{1, (1+pCC)/1.5}. (5)
Equating pCC to the second term and solving yields pCC =2.  Thus, pCC =1, or both parties cooperate
with certainty in this case.
In scenario 2, both agents defected in the first period.  Thus both have x  1.5.  As a
result, pDD = Pr(x > 2 - pDD | x  1.5), or
pDD = max{0, (pDD - .5)/1.5}. (6)
Solving for pDD yields pDD =-1, which implies that pDD =0, or both agents defect with certainty in
this case.
The final scenario pairs a first period cooperator and a first period (FP) defector.  In this
case, the two agents calculate different probabilities that their partner will cooperate.  Specifically,
the FP cooperator calculates the probability pDC that a FP defector (one with x 1.5) will
cooperate with a FP cooperator (one with x 1.5), and the FP defector calculates the probability
pCD that a FP cooperator will cooperate with a FP defector.  The mutual dependence of their
decisions implies that each agent's calculation depends on the other's calculation.  In particular,
pDC = Pr(x > 2 - pCD | x  1.5) (7)
pCD = Pr(x > 2 - pDC | x  1.5). (8)
Invoking the uniform distribution yields
pDC = ( pCD -.5)/ 1.5 (9)
pCD = ( 1+ pDC)/ 1.5. (10)
Finally, solving these simultaneous equations yields the equilibrium probabilities: pDC = .2 nd pCD =
.8.  That is, a CP who cooperated in the first period cooperates with a FP defector with
probability .2, and a CP who defected in the first period cooperates with a FP cooperator with
probability .8
The implied thresholds for cooperation can be found by substituting these probabilities
into (2).  The results are that a FP cooperator will cooperate with a FP defector if x 1.8, and a
FP defector will cooperate with a FP cooperator if x  1.2.  The implications of these results can
be found by comparing these thresholds with those established in the first period.  This
comparison is shown in figure 2.  As noted above, the region of interest is between x=1 and x=2,
where the conditional players reside.  Among these players, those with x between x=1.2 and
x=1.8 change their behavior when combined with a partner who adopted an opposite strategy in
the first period.  Specifically, agents with x between 1.2 and 1.5 who defected in the first period
choose to cooperate when paired with a first period cooperator, and agents with x between 1.5
and 1.8 who cooperated in the first period choose to defect when paired with a first period
defector.
Switching behavior is notable for three reasons.  First, it seems to correspond to real-life
behavior.  Sometimes, if agents who cooperate are cheated (say, in the first period), they will
defect in the next period, especially with a previous defector, no matter what the new partner's
intentions are.  The CP player has become "cynical."  Similarly, sometimes a former defector can
be induced to cooperate in the next period, especially if coupled with a known cooperator.  This
CP player has "reformed" because he has revised his assessment about his partner's behavior,
becoming more optimistic.
Second, switching in our model is conceptually distinct from other explanations.
"Rational" (material based) explanations for someone going from C to D might center on
mimicking a C (rational deception) in the first period in order to profit by defecting in the second
period.  In our model the switch occurs because a CP player becomes cynical about his partner.
Or it might be supposed that a player is following a tit-for-tat strategy.  In our model no strategy
is imposed; if CPs switch it is because of their preferences and revised expectations of partner
behavior, not an imposed behavioral rule.  Finally, the switch from D to C has not been widely
considered.  One could conceive that external social sanctions could induce the change, maybe by
changing the player's payoffs.  In our model the switch occurs because a CP who defects in the
first period updates his beliefs and becomes more optimistic about his partner's behavior.  No
external sanctions are necessary.
Finally, the switching behavior found in the analysis hints at important roles for
"community" and institutions.  We have already found one important role for some formal
institutions in the one period model, namely their ability to instill or reinforce preferences for
honesty.  Of course that role carries over to the two period model as well.  But additionally,
institutions could increase cooperation, even if preferences are exogenous, by reducing the
randomness of second period interactions, or, by assisting intentional interactions.  This
possibility occurs if certain institutions allow CP players to increase the chances of interacting
with first period cooperators.  Note that a move from random interaction to intentional interaction
would not affect the behavior of pure Cs or pure Ds.  In contrast, it was shown that cynical CPs
switched from cooperate to defect because their updated belief of first period defector has been
pessimistically revised.  The history is such that the first period partnership with a defector was
inevitable because it was random, xs could not be observed, and no choice to cooperate or defect
had yet been made.  But if randomness can be reduced in the second period, and CPs allowed to
intentionally couple with first period cooperators, then they would also cooperate and increase the
overall level of cooperation.  Overall cooperation could also increase if otherwise cynical CPs
could better assess the x of a partner who defected in the first period.  Specifically, if the partner's
x was between 1.2 and 1.5 and he played with a first period cooperator, the (otherwise) cynical
player could now be assured that his partner would cooperate in the second period, and he would
follow that strategy himself.
These induced roles for institutions suggest that intentional, rep ated interaction is
important.  A similar point has been made more casually by social commentators like Putnam
(1995) who suggest that if membership in social groups and clubs declines, we might expect to
see overall cooperation and trust decline.  Such an advent may lead to diminished community, a
concept that's admittedly difficult to grapple with.  But the effort is important.  As an example,
Daly and Cobb (1989, p.170) use the term "community" because they "want a term that suggests
that people are bound up with one another, sharing despite differences, a common identity.  We
want to emphasize that people participate together in shaping the larger grouping of which all are
members."   Clearly cooperative behavior is crucial in a proper understanding of community, but
the exact relationship is difficult to specify.  We simply suggest that the analysis so far goes some
way in describing a necessary element for community, but by no means is it sufficient.
   It may be that community depends not o ly upon trust (people doing what they say they
will do), but also on extra efforts -- both tangible and intangible.  Even if a person pays their local
tax bills, they may not be contributing to community in the sense that they don't volunteer, join a
civic organization, coach a little league team, or even just greet and help their neighbors.  If these
kinds of "investments" are important in developing and sustaining community, it is easy to see
how increased mobility and technology-based seclusion could contribute to its decline.
We now employ the model to see if we can gain any insights on how economic
interactions can affect investments in community.  Specifically, a new low cost player is added to
the analysis.
iii.  The Addition of a  New "Low Cost" Defector
Technological advances and investments in transportation and communications have made
it possible for any one person to interact with a larger set of people.  In an economic context this
might mean that any buyer can choose from a larger set of sellers because capital is more mobile,
thereby enhancing any one person's consumption possibilities.  Accordingly we extend the model
to include a new player, a seller, who is a known "low cost" defector.  To capture the notion of
community, the model needs a slightly different contextual interpretation.  Now we suppose that
both buyers and sellers can be counted on to pay their bills (for instance).  What they cannot be
counted on doing is making an additional investment (tangible or not) in community.  As
cooperation is now interpreted to mean that the person does make a social investment, defection
means they do not.  So, for example, a pure cooperator would make the promised investment
because to not do so would result in a high internal cost.  Both C's and D's alike materially benefit
from cooperator investments.  Assume that an investment by a cooperator results from any
interaction and benefits not only the players but also has external benefits for the community at
large.  As before, CP's only want to make an investment if their partners do.
We assume that the addition of a new (second period) low cost player refers only to
sellers; we focus on capital mobility.  This assumption seeks to capture, for example, the trend in
the U.S. of large discount retailers entering markets formerly inhabited only by smaller ones.
Large retailers are increasingly able to penetrate markets because of their low distribution costs.
These low distribution costs, in turn, are to some degree the result of government investments in
transportation and communications.
Usually, economists consider the provision of goods at a lower price to be only welfare
enhancing.  But the addition of new trading partners like discount retailers may also impose costs,
in the sense of reduced community investments.  Note buyers cannot intentionally interact with
the owner of a large discount retailer because the owner does not live in the community.  So,
somewhat simplistically, we assume the low cost seller is also a known defector because, by virtue
of his absence, he cannot make investments in the community that require his presence.  In our
model community breakdown can result if members of our third group (CP's) switch from
cooperating with cooperators to defecting with the new player.
Return to the case where x=3, and suppose that, as the result of investments in
transportation and communications technologies, the agents are allowed to interact with a new
player, a known defector, who offers partners the following payoff matrix (in wealth):
                                                                         Player I
                                                        Cooperate               Defect
Player II             Cooperate              5+l, 5+l              l, 6+l
                           Defect                    6+l, l                  2+l, 2+l
      Matrix 3.
That is, the new player offers a "bonus" of l,  but is also a known defector. Thus, if Player I is the
new player (seller), then Player II will receive l if he or she cooperates, and 2+l if he or she
defects -- i.e., only the payoffs in column 2 are available.
          Given the presence of this new player, which agents from the one-shot equilibrium (if any)
in section i will prefer switching to the new player and which will stay with the original group,
given various values of l? To answer this question, we assume that if a player stays with the
original group, he again pairs randomly with another of the remaining players, but that the
probability of meeting a cooperator adjusts appropriately to reflect any "switchers." Also, we
assume that the new player can accommodate any number of switchers without affecting the
payoffs in matrix 3 (i.e., there are no scale effects).
          To derive the equilibrium, we conjecture three ranges of players in the original set, as
illustrated in figure 3. Players with x between 0 and x1 switch to the new player and play defect,
players with x between x1 a d x2 stay with the original group and play defect, and players with x
between x2 and 3 stay and play cooperate. Define pl as th  fraction of cooperators among those
who stay in this new equilibrium, where, by figure 3
pl  = (3-x2)/(3-x1). (11)
To determine the equilibrium values of x1 and x2, note first that for those who stay, UC=5pl  and
UD=2+4pl-x. Since x2 is defined by UC=UD, we have
x2 = 2 - pl . (12)
Substituting (12) into (11) yields
pl  = (1+x1)/ 2. (13)
          Similarly, x1 is defined to be the point of indifference between switching, which yields a
payoff of 2+l-x, and staying and playing defect, which yields UD.  Equating these yields
l = 4pl . (14)
Solving (12), (13), and (14) simultaneously yields
x2 = 2 - (l/4) (15)
x1 = (l/2) - 1 (16)
pl  = l/4. (17)
          Note the following features of this equilibrium. First, when l=2, x1=0, x2=1.5, and pl =.5;
that is, the equilibrium is identical to that in the absence of the new player. Thus, for l<2, the
newcomer has no impact. However, when l>2, x1 becomes positive, so some D players start
switching. Note also that the new equilibrium is such that, when l is bet e 2 and 4, all players
who were playing D in the original equilibrium (without the newcomer) are in fact indiffer nt
between switching, and staying and playing D (i.e., given pl , both strategies yield utility of    2+l-
x). The outcome depicted in figure 3 therefore assumes that players with lower x's switch first.
This is the basis for the designation of [0, x1] as the set of players who switch and [x1,x2] as the set
who stay and play D. Finally, note that when l>5, all players find it desirable to switch, including
the pure C's. In that case, pure C's will cooperate and receive a payoff of l, and everyone else will
defect and receive a payoff of 2+l-x.
          Now consider in more detail what happens when l is between 2 and 5. Notice that as l
increases, x1 and pl  increase, and x2 decreases. Thus, the number of players who switch increases,
the number who stay and play D decreases, and the number who stay and play C increases. In
figure 3, x1 moves to the right and x2 moves left.  Intuitively, as defectors start to leave, the
environment becomes more favorable for mutual cooperation among remaining players.
          When l=4, note that x1= 2=1 and pl =1. At this point, all D's have switched, leaving only
CP's and C's, all of whom are cooperating. The payoff for cooperators is UC=5, whereas the
payoff from switching and defecting is UlD=2+l-x. The marginal CP player, for whom x=1, is thus indifferent between staying and
switching. If l increases further, however, he will be induced to switch and play defect with the n wcomer. This point of indifference, x3=l-3 (found by
equating Ul D and UC), will continue to rise with l until it equals 2 at l=5. At this point, only C's are left. When l>5, as noted above, even the C's will
find it beneficial to switch to the newcomer, though they will continue to play C since their payoff from doing so is l, which exceeds their payoff from
cooperation with each other (12).
          Figure 4 summarizes the impact of increasing l. The solid curve, pl shows the fraction of
remaining players who cooperate, and the dashed curve shows the fraction of the original
population who switch. Note that for l between zero and 2, the original equilibrium is unaffected;
that is, no players switch and half of the population cooperates. As l inc eases from 2 to 4, the
number of players who switch increases and the fraction of cooperators increases. As noted, this
is due to the fact that all switchers over this range are D's (i.e., x<1), so remaining CP players are
more willing to cooperate because they are less concerned about cooperating with defectors.
Indeed, at l=4, only CP's and C's remain, and all cooperate.  As l is s further, however, the M's
begin to switch as well (and play D) until all have done so at l=5. Finally, as l rises above 5, even
the C's switch, although they continue to play C despite the fact that the newcomer is a known
defector.
Figure 4 shows that the newcomer's impact on community is initially favorable because it
attracts away freeriding defectors.  The incidence of cooperation increases even though the siz  of
the community declines.  However, if the newcomer offers sufficient surplus (l>4), CP's are
induced to switch and defect, ultimately reducing the total level of cooperation.  When the surplus
is very large (l>5), the community diminishes to its minimal because all remaining cooperators
switch and interact with the defecting newcomer.  Only pure cooperators are making community
investments.
It is possible, however, that the community will reach this minimal level, or even dissolve
altogether, even if the newcomer offers low surplus.  Complete dissolution could occur if a critical
mass is necessary for a community to survive, due to fixed costs and economies of scale for
instance.  The case of shopping malls driving out independent, "downtown" merchants is an
obvious example.  Thus at some point, after a critical number of defectors and/or CP's have
switched, all other remaining players are forced to switch -- causing an early dissolution of
community if the threshold of pure C's investment in community is insufficient.  Interestingly,
while this "participation constraint" lowers total  welfare when measured as the sum of utilities, it
increases aggregate wealth because it forces cooperators and CP's to interact with the low cost
newcomer in situations they would not have otherwise (i.e., without the constraint).
In summary, this extension to the model has tried to capture the perhaps unintended
effects of investments in transportation and communication technologies.  To the extent
community depends upon cooperative investments, the advent of "defecting" newcomers may
diminish community even if they offer other benefits.
IV.  Conclusion
Our analysis has sought to more fully capture real human behavior.  While some people do
not have strong preferences over honesty, others do.  This point seems to have eluded many
economists.  The analysis offered here shows that a fuller characterization of behavior need not
lead to trivial results.  We did not impose a preference for cooperation.  Instead, non-material and
endogenous preferences were employed to (1) generate three types of (equilibrium) behavior, (2)
show the importance of social institutions like education and religion on cooperation levels, (3)
illustrate "switching" behavior in repeated interactions, which implies a different role for social
institutions, and (4) begin to assess the adverse affects on community from technology induced
increases in consumption possibilities.
While we think the analysis offered here is a good starting point, much work remains.  In
particular we need to see more precisely how social institutions can affect preferences.  The
simple characterization showing that social institutions can generate values, thereby affecting
preferences and cooperation rates does not invite confidence in policy prescriptions.  More
precise relationships will have to be identified before policy recommendations could be made.
Second, while we think we have captured an important phenomenon of cynical behavior in
repeated interactions, we need to better specify how institutions can aid intentional interactions to
reduce cynicism.  The same goes for how institutions might aid in giving (first period) defectors a
second chance.  Theoretically, the possibility of switching behavior needs to be investigated when
agents are unboundedly rational to determine if our results are robust.
Finally, much more work needs to be done on the elusive idea of community.  We have
suggested that community diminishes with cynical behavior and increases in capital mobility.  But
that is only a starting point.  Other factors that have been mentioned are increased work hours,
increased T.V. watching hours, and just a general increase in the sense of alienation in society.
These too may be important factors.  While we have offered a start, the complexity of the
problem necessitates much more work, both theoretical and empirical.  We can only hope that
economists do not continue to shy away from it, as the importance surely outweighs the difficulty.
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